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Gough: <em>Lundy’s Lane</em> [Review]

recounting his many impressive
achievements in the cause of
Canadian unity and the country
which he loved, David Bercuson
builds a persuasive case for why
"one of the most interesting
Canadians of the twentieth century" (p.xi) should be remembered
by a generation that does not seem
as sure as he was of what binds
them together.
David A. Lenarcic
Wilfrid Laurier University

*****

The Battle of
Lundy's Lane
On the Niagara in 1814
Donald E. Graves. The Battle of
Lundy's Lane: On the Niagara in
1814. (Baltimore, Maryland: The
Nautical & Aviation Publishing
Company of America, 1993) 342
pages, $24.99 US.

B

attle campaigns of the War of
1812 generally go unnoticed
in the larger history of warfare,
and in many cases are neglected
altogether by students of military
history. Thus it is a matter for
celebration to find a superb
history of one such battle, Donald
Graves' Lundy's Lane. This book
promises to revive our interest in
the Anglo-American war in which
Canadians played such a
conspicuous part in the defence
of their homeland. More than this,
however, this study will stimulate
the reader to wonder why the great
conflict ever happened in the first
place and, equally important, to
ponder the legacies of this
bloodiest of Anglo-American
encounters.
In one of the many quotations
that pepper this book, with profit,

Donald Graves cites C.P. Stacey's
quip: "The War of 1812 is one of
those episodes in history that
make everybody happy, because
everybody interprets it in his own
way. The Americans think of it
primarily as a naval war in which
the pride of the Mistress of the
Seas was humbled by what an
imprudent Englishman had called
'a few fir-built frigates manned
by a handful of bastards and
outlaws.' Canadians think of it
equally pridefully as a war of
defence in which their brave
fathers ... saved the country from
conquest. And the English are the
happiest of all because they don't
even know it existed." These
assessments derive basically from
the fact that the war tended to
settle few if any differences existing between the United Kingdom
and the United States. Although
the diplomacy of the war, and the
making of the peace which
followed it on Christmas Eve 1814,
fall outside of the focus of this
book we generally conclude that
the war altered hardly at all the
relations between the two powers:
what mattered most was the
successful defence of Canada. If
Loyalist settlement moulded the
political character of the western
frontiers of what was then the
Province of Quebec, and shaped
the destiny of Upper Canada, then
surely the War of 1812 congealed
Canadian attitudes against any
future American invasion. Lundy's
Lane was the anvil, and here the
Americans decided to hammer
their great blow. They did not
succeed.
On the sultry evening of 25
July 1814, almost within sight of
Niagara Falls, American troops
attacked British regular forces
that were assisted by Canadian
fencibles and militia. It was a
savage encounter, the most bitterly
contested in the War of 1812. It

began with parry and thrust, and
continued into the night as troops.
in pitch darkness, struck at the
enemy with determination. What
are now called "losses from friendly
fire" were regular occurrences. The
power of the Royal Artillery,
advantageously placed on an
eminence, wasted unprotected
American infantry. Royal Scots and
the 8th, 41st and 89th Regiments of
Foot put up stout resistance. The
officer commanding British forces
was Canadian-born Sir Gordon
Drummond, who was wounded,
and his second-in-command was
captured. By early the next day
the British and Canadians had
kept their ground, and the
Americans retired toward Fort
Erie, there to fight again in what is
an important coda to this story.
As a battle, Lundy's Lane offers
the historian rich possibilities for
research. Donald Graves has
mastered all known sources. In
particular he has used to great
effect the official reports of
General Drummond and those
answering to him. Drummond
faced two great adversaries, both
of whom went on to subsequent
distinguished careers in the United
States Army-Major-General
Jacob Jennings Brown and
Brigadier-General Winfield Scott.
The contribution of Lundy's Lane
to the making of the careers of
Drummond, Brown and Scott can
be imagined, for all three went on
to distinguished careers in the
military and public service.
Graves scrupulously scans the
official reports of these field
commanders against other
evidence, and it is pleasing to see
him check Drummond's enthusiastic report on his own success.
Similarly, Graves notes numerously
how E.W. Cruikshank lacked full
access to documentation that
would have given a more
even-handed assessment of
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British successes. As Graves
demonstrates (p.242), "when the
fighting ended, the [American] Left
Division was in possession ofboth
the hill and the guns and withdrew
of its own accord." Thus, sadly for
Canadian history, the Americans
were not expelled from the rise, as
Cruikshank claimed, but withdrew
of their own accord. In demonstrating this, and other wonderful
particulars, Graves has used
various diaries and newly-unearthed reports. One such is
Private Shadrack Byfield's record,
which provides one of the many
narratives of the encounter. "We
then moved on for the field of
action," recollected Byfield of the
41st Foot. "We had a guide with
us and when we came near the
field, our captain was called upon,
by name, in a loud voice, to form
on the left of the speaker. It being
night, we could not discover what
regiment it was. The guide
positively asserted that it was one
of the enemy. Our bugle then
sounded for the company to drop.
A volley was then fired upon us,
which killed two corporals, and
wounded a sergeant, and several
of the men. The company then
rose, fired, and charged. The
enemy quitted their position; we
followed and took three field
pieces." (p.241) Collateral evidence
from Thomas Jessup's memoir of
the Niagara campaign sustains
the view that the Americans
withdrew of their own accord. The
loser, in the end is historian
Cruikshank, whom Donald
Graves states was unaware of, or
chose to omit, critically-important
details. In reconstructing the last
stage of the battle Graves has
been circumspect in getting the
sequence of events correct. He
concludes that the bulk of the
[British] Right Division did not
reoccupy the hill, that companies
ofthe 104thand89thfootregiments

remained nearby until early dawn
allowed them to discover, with
delight, the vacant ground and
unattended field pieces, once
previously theirs. In short, the
Left Division "voluntarily gave up
both the hill and the captured
artillery."
The battle is told in great detail,
and the key characters enter and
depart from the scene in a fashion
characteristic of great historical
narrative. The formalistic nature
of early phases of the encounter
offered great tactical opportunity
to Scott and to Brown. But their
successes, such as they were, were

bought at terrible costs of life and
human suffering. Skilful British
Artillery work was bound to falter
with successive changes of light
and determined enemy charges.
Deployments and redeployments
of skirmishing parties by both
sides in a confined field of battle
intersected by fences and
surrounded by thickets made
hand-to-hand combat a regular
feature
of
the
battle.
The costs, in killed and
wounded, were staggering: the
British line regiments together lost
84 officers and men killed, 559
wounded, 42 prisoners, and 193
missing-a total of 878 casualties,

that is, about 24 per cent of the
British force engaged. Of the
Canadian units, the Incorporated
Militia suffered severely, losing
142 of 402 all ranks. Others
including the Glengarry Light
Infantry got off lightly. In total,
British losses amount to about
800 men. American losses were
similar, perhaps higher. Brown
reported 860 casualties: more
than twice as many American
officers and men were killed in the
encounter than British, primarily
because of effective British
artillery and heavier British
musket ball. Some American
units, particularly Scott's First
Brigade, took terrible losses of
thirty-five percent killed, wounded
or missing. In truth, both sides
suffered immeasurably, and the
details of how death and dying
occurred are the stuff of a John
Keegan or a John Ellis. Here we
have an excellent example of
"sharp end" history.
Donald Graves has provided
an excellent description and
analysis of field medicine in
practice. Case by case he
examines how field surgeons, such
as William Dunlop of the 89th
Foot, dealt with casualties.
Amputation afforded an early,
effective treatment, but had
different theoretical foundations.
Many casualties had suffered
multiple wounds. Musket balls and
artillery rounds did the greatest
damage, and seventy-five percent
of all wounds were inflicted in the
torso and legs. Very few i~uries
were caused by edged weapons.
Jagged fragments of howitzer and
shrapnel shells created severe
damage at their entry points;
canister bullets, very damaging,
often passed through the body;
slower-moving musket balls were
deflected by bone, cartilage or
muscle. Treating of various
wounds involved various techniques
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and instruments. Many wounded
soldiers, such as the stoical
Shadrack Byfield submitted quietly
to losing an arm by amputation,
and, in one of the many interesting
snippets that pepper this book,
we are told that Byfield, a weaver
by trade, survived the amputation,
had an artificial limb arranged for
him, and pursued weaving in later
years. We can marvel at the
difficulties of the army surgeon,
and as Dunlop put it correctly,
"there is hardly on the face of the
earth a less enviable situation
than that of an Army Surgeon
after a battle-worn out and
fatigued in body and mind,
surrounded by suffering, pain and
misery, much of which he knows
it is not in his power to heal or
even to assuage. While battle lasts
these all pass unnoticed, but they
come before the medical man
afterwards in all their sorrow and
horror, stripped of all the excitement of the 'heady fight.'" (p.175).
Students of military history,
and the War of 1812 in particular,
will welcome the extensive
bibliography of both primary and
secondary works. The work
contains numerous illustrations
and boasts a serviceable index.
The book is enriched by several
good maps that help the armchair
observer follow the campaign. A
note on terminology and time aids
the reader to follow the sequence
of the battle, and to differentiate
between British and American
forces. Wisely, ancillary data has
been relegated to four appendixes:
Order of Battle and Strength, Left
Division, United States Army;
Order ofBattle and Strength, Right
Division, British Army in Canada,
25 July 1814; The Military Heritage
of the Battle of Lundy's Lane:
Honors, Awards, and Descendants
of the Units of 1814; The Problem
of the Guns (which army was in
possession of the British guns at

the end of the battle); and The
Fate of the Battlefield, 1814-1992.
In regards to the last of these, we
learn, sadly (p.249) that little exists
of the battlefield for the shaded
lane of yesteryear is now a busy
highway crowded with motels,
eateries and souvenir shops. "You
cansleep,"writesGravespoignantly,
"in air-conditioned comfort near
the same spot where the four-times
wounded Jessup formed the
Twenty-Fifth into a single rank to
repel Drummond's last desperate
attack ... "Nearby the Drummond
Hill Cemetery tells a different tale,
and in graves marked and
unmarked lie British, Canadian
and American bodies of this
bloodiest of encounters on the
Niagara.
Barry Gough
Wilfrid Laurier University

lived between one archive
and another, particularly
between one conference and
the next, spinning theories
further and further detached
from whatever it was that
wentonatNeuvill-St. Vaast,
Goose Green, Kuwait City
... Reputations are wonrarely lost-on the issue of
Clausewitz's debt to Kant,
or 'chaos theory and
command'... Like the
"eight-legged" essay of
the Chinese mandarin
examination, for which the
highest marks were given
to those candidates who
most often alluded to the
question without doing
anything as indelicate as
attempting an answer,
military history ala mode
is written through analogy,
subtexts and alternative
readings.

*****

The Generals
The Canadian Army's
Senior Commanders in the
Second World War
J.L. Granatstein. The Generals:
The Canadian Army's Senior
Commanders in the Second World
War. Toronto: Stoddart Publishing
Co., 1993, 370 pages, $35.00.

I

n ending his review ofBetween
Mutiny and Obedience (Times
Literary Supplement, 13May 1994)
makes an unfortunately valid
point about much recent military
historiography when he writes that
the new sort of historian "can
bear the gaze of fact only if it is
veiled in a gauze of abstract ideas,
woven from the busy looms of
social science and political theory."
He goes on to discuss whole
wacademic lives being successfully

Most of our military historians
are free of Keegan's charges and
this includes Jack Granatstein,
even if he is an "academic." In the
volume I have been asked to
review, a "collective biography" of
Canada's Second World War
military leadership, the former
Sandhurst lecturer, Keegan,
would have considerable difficulty
finding support for his thesis.
It must be assumed that the
general reader with no more than
a passing interest in his country's
history, military or other, may
still believe naively (and in spite of
the twisted efforts of manipulative media people with revisionist
axes to grind) that the men who
led the men in '39-'45 wore the
mantle of heroic leadership with
appropriate modesty grounded in
the firm conviction of the rightness
of the cause coupled with the
ability to lead with both
inspiration and competence.
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